SR/414/2025

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT UNDER THE ANTI-DOPING RULES OF WORLD ATHLETICS

Before:
Charles Hollander KC (Chair)
Anna Smirnova
Hannu Kalkas

BETWEEN:

WORLD ATHLETICS ***Anti-doping Organisation***

– and –

TWINKLE CHAUDHARY ***Respondent***

DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Claimant, World Athletics ("**WA**"), is the International Federation governing the sport of Athletics worldwide. It has its registered seat in Monaco. WA has delegated the implementation of its Anti-Doping Rules, the 2025 World Athletics Anti-Doping Rules ("**ADR**") to the Athletics Integrity Unit ("**AIU**") in accordance with Rule 1.2.2 ADR.

2. The Respondent, Ms Twinkle Chaudhary (the "**Athlete**"), is a 30-year-old middle-distance runner from India.

3. Hereafter, the AIU and the Athlete are collectively referred to as the "**Parties**".

A. The Charges

4. In a Notice of Charge, dated 23 October 2025, the AIU asserted the following anti-doping rule violations ("**ADRVs**") against the Athlete based on the presence of Metabolites of Methyltestosterone in the Athlete's urine Sample, collected on 30 May 2025 (the "**Sample**"):

   a. Presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete's Sample, pursuant to Rule 2.1 ADR; and

   b. Use of a Prohibited Substance (specifically Methyltestosterone), pursuant to Rule 2.2 ADR.

5. In response to the Notice of Allegation, dated 24 June 2025, the Athlete in her explanation on 2 September 2025 indicated that she denied committing the asserted ADRVs on the basis that the Sample may not have belonged to her or that it may have been tampered with or contaminated during collection.

B. The Adverse Analytical Finding

6. The Sample, provided In-Competition at the 26th Asian Athletics Championships in Gumi, South Korea, was assigned code 8182508, and was collected pursuant to Testing conducted by the AIU on behalf of World Athletics.

7. The Sample was analysed by the World Anti-Doping Agency ("**WADA**") accredited laboratory in Seoul, South Korea (the "**Laboratory**"), and resulted in an Adverse Analytical Finding ("**AAF**") for the presence of Metabolites of Methyltestosterone, specifically 17α-methyl-5α-androstane-3α,17β-diol and 17α-methyl-5β-androstane-3α,17β-diol.

8. Methyltestosterone (and its Metabolites) is a Prohibited Substance under the WADA 2025 Prohibited List, under the category S1.1 Anabolic Androgenic Steroids. It is a Non-Specified Substance prohibited at all times.

9. Methyltestosterone is a Non-Threshold Substance, not a Threshold Substance. The Metabolites of Methyltestosterone detected in the Sample are also not subject to any Minimum Reporting Level ("**MRL**") below which an AAF should not be reported. Accordingly, this means that any concentration of the Metabolites of Methyltestosterone detected in the Sample is sufficient to constitute a valid AAF.

C. Procedural History

10. In accordance with Article 5.1.2.1 of the International Standard for Results Management ("**ISRM**"), the AIU issued the Athlete with a Notice of Allegation of Anti-Doping Rule Violations, imposed a Provisional Suspension (effective immediately) and invited her to provide her explanation for the AAF.

11. On 11 July 2025, the Athlete informed the AIU that she could not afford the B Sample analysis costs.

12. On 2 September 2025, Mr Saurabh Mishra, counsel on behalf of the Athlete, submitted the Athlete's detailed explanation, which averred that:

    a. The Athlete did not take any Prohibited Substance intentionally to enhance her sport performance;

    b. Although the results from the Athlete's analysis of the supplements she had taken at the relevant time were negative, and she had not therefore established the source of the Metabolites of Methyltestosterone detected in the Sample, such "*proof of source*" was not necessary to find that the Athlete's ADRVs were not intentional, and other factors supported such a finding in her case, including her recent inclusion in the National Anti-

Doping Agency ("**NADA**") India Registered Testing Pool, her 4th place in the competition on 30 May 2025, and her clean record and credentials (as supported by character evidence); and

c. The Athlete maintained that the Sample may not belong to her or that it may have been tampered with or contaminated during collection, and averred that the AIU's refusal of her request for DNA analysis was "*against the rule of fairness enshrined in the WADA Code and CAS jurisprudence*."

13. On 20 November 2025, the Athlete requested an oral hearing in this matter.

D. Hearing before the Disciplinary Tribunal

14. On 25 November 2025, the Chairperson of the Disciplinary and Appeals Tribunal ("**Disciplinary Tribunal**"), Mr Charles Hollander KC, appointed himself to Chair the Disciplinary Panel (the "**Panel**") to hear this matter. On 26 January 2026, Ms Anna Smirnova and Mr Hannu Kalkas were appointed as members of the Panel in these proceedings.

15. An oral hearing took place by video conference on 12 February 2026. It was attended by the following persons:

<u>For World Athletics:</u>

a. Mr Tony Jackson, AIU Deputy Head of Case Management

b. Ms Annalisa Cherubino, Case Manager

c. Mr Joe Wightman, Case Manager

<u>For the Athlete:</u>

d. Ms Twinkle Chaudhary

e. Mr Saurabh Mishra, counsel

16. The Parties had agreed that since there was no significant dispute on the facts, that it was unnecessary for oral evidence to be led. However, given that shortly before the hearing an issue arose as to whether the Athlete had breached the Provisional Suspension (discussed below), Ms Chaudhary gave oral evidence on that specific issue and was cross-examined by Mr Jackson for the AIU on that issue.

II. JURISDICTION

17. There was no issue as to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Tribunal pursuant to Rule 8.2 ADR. The Sample was collected from the Athlete following her participation in the 26th Asian Athletics Championships, which is an Event recognised by World Athletics.

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Burdens and Standard of Proof

18. Rule 3.1 ADR provides:

> ***Burdens and Standards of Proof***
>
> *The Integrity Unit or other Anti-Doping Organisation will have the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred. The standard of proof will be whether the Integrity Unit or other Anti-Doping Organisation has established an anti-doping rule violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation that has been made. This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Where these Anti-Doping Rules place the burden of proof upon the Athlete or other Person alleged*

to have committed an anti-doping rule violation to rebut a presumption or establish specified facts or circumstances, except as provided in Rules 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, the standard of proof will be by a balance of probability."

B. Methods of establishing Facts and Presumptions

19. Rule 3.2 ADR provides:

*"**Methods of establishing Facts and Presumptions***

Facts related to anti-doping rule violations may be established by any reliable means, including admissions."

C. Other Relevant Rules

20. Rule 2 ADR provides as follows:

"2.1 Presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete's Sample

2.1.1 It is each Athlete's personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters their body. Athletes are responsible for any Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their Samples. Accordingly, it is not necessary to demonstrate intent, Fault, Negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete's part in order to establish a Rule 2.1 anti-doping rule violation.

2.1.2 Sufficient proof of an anti-doping rule violation under Rule 2.1 is established by any of the following: (i) the presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete's A Sample where the Athlete waives analysis of the B Sample and the B Sample is not analysed; (ii) where the analysis of the Athlete's B Sample confirms the presence of the Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found

in the Athlete's A Sample; or (iii) where the Athlete's A or B Sample is split into two parts and the analysis of the confirmation part of the split Sample confirms the presence of the Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found in the first part of the split Sample or the Athlete waives analysis of the confirmation part of the split Sample.

2.1.3 Excepting those substances for which a Decision Limit is specifically identified in the Prohibited List or a Technical Document, the presence of any reported quantity of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete's Sample will constitute an anti-doping rule violation.

2.1.4 As an exception to the general rule of Rule 2.1, the Prohibited List, International Standards or Technical Documents may establish special criteria for reporting or the evaluation of certain Prohibited Substances."

21. Rule 2.2 ADR also provides that the Use of a Prohibited Substance constitutes an ADRV:

*"**2.2 Use or Attempted Use by an Athlete of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method***

2.2.1 It is the Athlete's personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters their body and that no Prohibited Method is Used. Accordingly, it is not necessary to demonstrate intent, Fault, Negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete's part in order to establish an anti-doping rule violation for Use of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method.

[Comment to Rule 2.2: It has always been the case that Use or Attempted Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method may be established by any reliable means. As noted in the Comment to Rule 3.2, unlike the proof required to establish an anti-doping rule violation under Rule 2.1, Use or Attempted Use may also be established by other reliable means such as admissions by the Athlete, witness statements, documentary evidence, conclusions drawn from longitudinal profiling, including data collected as part of the Athlete Biological Passport, or other

analytical information that does not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to establish the presence of a Prohibited Substance under Rule 2.1. For example, Use may be established based upon reliable analytical data from the analysis of an A Sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a B Sample) or from the analysis of a B Sample alone where the Anti-Doping Organisation provides a satisfactory explanation for the lack of confirmation in the other Sample.]"

22. Rule 3.2.3 ADR confirms that WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed to have conducted sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard for Laboratories ("**ISL**") and that the Athlete may rebut this presumption by establishing that a departure from the ISL occurred that could reasonably have caused the AAF. In those circumstances, the burden then shifts to the AIU to establish that such departure did not cause the AAF.

23. Rule 3.2.4 ADR confirms that departures from any other International Standard (e.g., the International Standard for Testing and Investigations ("**ISTI**") will not invalidate analytical results or other evidence of an ADRV and will not constitute a defence to an ADRV. However, if the Athlete establishes a departure from the ISTI relating to sample collection or handling that could reasonably have caused an ADRV based on an AAF, the burden then shifts to the AIU to demonstrate that such departure did not cause the AAF.

IV. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

24. The Athlete was unable to explain the presence of Methyltestosterone and its metabolites. Such tests as the Athlete was able to run on the supplements she had ingested, did not reveal the presence of Methyltestosterone.

25. Her case was that no evidence had been presented of deliberate ingestion. In particular, there was:

a. no evidence of a dosing pattern or cycling;

b. no repeated adverse findings;

c. no involvement of coaches, doctors, or third parties;

d. no communications or admissions suggesting intent, and

e. no credible sporting rationale for deliberate ingestion of methyltestosterone, a substance associated with pronounced androgenic effects and significant physiological risk.

26. She also submitted that the AAF is isolated and inconsistent with the Athlete's otherwise clean anti-doping history. She had tested negative on many occasions.

A. DNA Sample

27. The Athlete indicated that she wished to subject the Sample to DNA testing in order to satisfy herself as to its integrity and provenance. The AIU refused.

28. During the hearing, the Athlete reiterated her request for DNA analysis and expressed her readiness to cover the expenses of the DNA test.

29. The Athlete submitted, that the Court of Arbitration for Sport's ("**CAS**") authority shows, that issues concerning sample identity and manipulation are treated as central to ensuring procedural fairness and the reliability of anti-doping results.

30. The Athlete suggested that the circumstances of the taking of the Sample provided a basis for questioning of its provenance and integrity. Firstly, she had been tested during heats rather than in the final, which she said was highly unusual. Secondly, her fellow competitors in the heats were not tested. Thirdly, there was no obvious benefit for her in doping. Fourthly, as she had not taken any Prohibited Substance, a problem with the Sample was a possible and logical explanation for the positive result.

31. The AIU submitted that a DNA test does not form part of usual procedure and is not provided for in the applicable regulations. It would therefore be for the Athlete to establish that a departure from the ISTI, relating to Sample collection or handling, could reasonably have caused the AAF. In those circumstances, the burden would then shift to the AIU to demonstrate that such departure did not cause the AAF.

32. In CAS 2015/A/3915 *Iago Gorgodze v. IPC*, the CAS Panel stated:

> *"155. In the Panel's opinion, DNA testing is not a usual procedure in anti-doping matters, and it is not provided for by the applicable regulations. In addition, in the present case, there are no particular factual elements that would justify such analysis, given the above considerations regarding the departures from the IST. Indeed, the identity of the A and B samples was clear throughout the process. It is therefore not necessary for the Panel to decide whether a DNA test would be conclusive in the present matter."*

33. In CAS 2012/A/2696 *Steve Mullings v. JADCO*, the CAS Panel confirmed that a reasonable basis for questioning the lab results needs to be presented before a DNA test can be sought by the Athlete:

> *"7.4 Because Mullings was unable to present any basis for challenging the lab documentation and results, the Panel denied his request for DNA testing on the sample. Such testing is complex and expensive, and it cannot be ordered whenever an athlete requests it. Rather, the athlete should first be required to present some reasonable basis for questioning the lab results to justify any DNA testing. Mullings presented no such basis here."*

34. In CAS 2018/A/5518 *Nicola Ruffoni v. UCI*, the CAS Panel stated the following:

> *"115. The Rider requested that a DNA test be conducted on his sample on the basis that it may have been tampered with during the doping control process.*

116. However, where the chain of custody of a sample was intact, there is no evidence that the doping control process was not performed in accordance with the applicable standards in a manner which could put in question the integrity of the sample, and the Laboratory Documentation Package is in order, there is no reasonable basis for questioning the laboratory results and there is no justification for a DNA testing. See CAS 2012/A/2696 at paras. 7.3 and 7.4.

117. The panel in CAS 2012/A/2696 at para. 7.4 stated that:

> "DNA testing is complex and expensive, and it cannot be ordered whenever an athlete requests. Rather, the athlete should first be able to present some reasonable basis for questioning the Jab results to justify any DNA testing."

118. There may be situations where an athlete can establish a genuine doubt regarding the identity of a sample and a DNA test may be permitted.

119. However, in these proceedings there was not even a sliver of evidence regarding tampering, or a motive or opportunity to do so. Under the circumstances, the Panel concluded that the Rider did not establish a reasonable basis for DNA testing of the sample and there was no basis to allow such a process which would have amounted to nothing more than an ex post fishing expedition."

35. The AIU said that the Athlete had been chosen for Testing in the light of a recent dramatic improvement in her results. So, there was nothing unusual or fortuitous about her being tested.

B. Proof of Intention

36. Rule 10.2.1 ADR provides that the Athlete bears the burden of establishing that the ADRVs were not intentional to reduce the period of Ineligibility from the mandatory period of four (4) years as follows:

"10.2.1 Save where Rule 10.2.4 applies, the period of Ineligibility will be four years where:

(a) The anti-doping rule violation does not involve a Specified Substance or a Specified Method, unless the Athlete or other Person can establish that the anti-doping rule violation was not intentional.

[...]

10.2.2 If Rule 10.2.1 does not apply, then (subject to Rule 10.2.4(a)) the period of Ineligibility will be two years."

37. Rule 10.2.3 ADR specifies the meaning of the term 'intentional' in the context of Rule 10.2 ADR:

"As used in Rule 10.2, the term 'intentional' is meant to identify those Athletes or other Persons who engage in conduct that they knew constituted an antidoping rule violation or knew that there was a significant risk that the conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule violation and manifestly disregarded that risk. [...]"

The Comment to Article 10.2.1.1 of the WADA Anti-Doping Code 2021 provides as follows:

"While it is theoretically possible for an Athlete or other Person to establish that the anti-doping rule violation was not intentional without showing how the Prohibited Substance entered one's system, it is highly unlikely that in a doping case under Article 2.1 an Athlete will be successful in proving that the Athlete acted unintentionally without establishing the source of the Prohibited Substance."

38. Methyltestosterone is a non-Specified Prohibited Substance. The period of Ineligibility shall therefore be four (4) years unless the Athlete can establish that the ADRVs were not intentional.

39. In CAS 2023/A/9377 *Kristian Jensen v. World Rugby*, the CAS Panel noted that

> *"[…] there exists an extensive and consistent line of CAS awards holding that establishing the origin of the Prohibited Substance is a crucial, almost indispensable element for an athlete to disprove intent, the absence of which leaves only "*the narrowest of corridors through which such athlete must pass to discharge the burden which lies upon him*" (CAS 2017/A/5016 & 5036 - **Abdelrahman** - para. 123, CAS 2020/A/7068 - **Iannone** - para. 134). On the contrary, there are only a few cases at CAS that would comfortably support a deviation from this general rule that the athlete is highly unlikely to be able to disprove intent in the absence of a credible identification of the source. These few cases (inter alia, CAS 2016/A/4534 and CAS 2020/A/7579 & 7580) in which a lack of intent can be affirmed without the athlete establishing the source of the Prohibited Substance are outliers."*

40. In addition, in CAS 2024/A/10800 & CAS 2024/A/10802 *World Athletics & WADA v. Erriyon Knighton* (award dated 12 September 2025), the CAS Panel confirmed CAS jurisprudence that an athlete must establish origin to demonstrate an absence of intent unless the case is extremely rare and that this must in any event be by way of concrete evidence (rather than protestations of innocence or hypotheses):

> *"109. As regards the question of whether in order to establish lack of intent, within the meaning of Article 10.2 of the WADC, the Athlete has to establish the source of the Prohibited Substance found in his Sample, the Panel notes that unlike the definitions of NFN (Article 10.5 of the WADC) and NSFN (Article 10.6 of the WADC), the wording of this provision does not require the Athlete to establish how that Substance entered their system in order to claim that the ADRV was not intentional. However, according to constant CAS jurisprudence, apart from extremely rare cases (see CAS 2016/A/4534, CAS 2016/A/4676, and CAS 2016/A/4919), an athlete must establish how the prohibited substance entered their system in order to discharge the burden of establishing the lack of intention (CAS 2016/A/4377, CAS 2023/A/9377). This is also clear from the abovementioned comment to Article 10.2.1.1 of the WADC.*

110. *To establish the origin of the prohibited substance, it is not sufficient for an athlete to merely protest their innocence and suggest that the substance must have entered their body inadvertently from a supplement, medicine, or other product. Rather, an athlete must adduce concrete evidence to demonstrate that a particular supplement, medication, or other product that the he or she has taken did contain the substance in question. For example, details about the date of intake, the location and route of intake, or any other details about the ingestion are necessary (CAS 2017/A/5248).*

111. *In this regard, the Panel concurs with other CAS panels which considered that the requirement of showing how the Prohibited Substance got into an athlete's system must be enforced rather strictly since, if the manner in which a substance entered in athletes system is unknown or unclear, it is logically difficult to determine whether the athlete has taken precautions to prevent such occurrence. The threshold requirement of showing how the substance entered an athlete's system is to enable, inter alia, the CAS to determine the issue of fault on the basis of facts and not speculation (CAS 2012/A/2760). In the Panel's view, an athlete has to adduce some cogent evidence showing that his or her explanation for the AAF, in the present matter the oxtail contamination scenario, is scientifically plausible (CAS 2017/A/5296). Therefore, there must be a causal link between the allegedly contaminated product ingested, and the Prohibited Substance found in the athlete's system (CAS 2023/A/10025 & 10227).*

112. *Finally, regarding the above mentioned "*extremely rare cases*" in which a ADRV may be deemed unintentional even if an athlete has failed to prove the source of a prohibited substance, the Panel considers that in such a case an athlete has to establish lack of intention with other robust evidence, such as the possibility that the prohibited substance came from a specific product, the athlete's credible testimony, evidence by the athlete's doctors that the athlete had no intent to use a prohibited substance, or the implausibility of a scenario*

that the athlete intentionally used prohibited substances (CAS 2017/A/5248 and CAS 2023/A/10273). Or, as the CAS Panel in CAS 2023/A/9451, 9455 & 9456 has summarized it:

*"*An athlete must provide actual evidence to support his protestations of innocence; he or she must provide 'concrete and persuasive evidence establishing such lack of intent on the balance of probabilities'; protestations of innocence, however credible they appear, 'carry no material weight in the analysis of intent' [...]. The same applies to a 'lack of a demonstrable sporting incentive to dope, diligent attempts to discover the origin of the prohibited substance or the athlete's clean record', which have constantly been rejected as justifications for a plea of lack of intent […]*".*

41. In his submissions, Mr Mishra submitted that there were cases where it had been held that the athlete had satisfied the burden of showing lack of intention notwithstanding not being able to prove the source of the positive test.

V. DISCUSSION

42. The first issue is whether the Athlete can show that the ADRV was not intentional. The burden is on the Athlete to show this. It is well established in CAS caselaw that in any normal case an assertion by the Athlete, coupled with a protestation of innocence, is insufficient for this purpose. Indeed, were this not the case, the regime would break down as every Athlete would assert their innocence and the AIU would be unable to prove the contrary. It is true that there have been cases where the athlete has been held to have satisfied their burden without being able to show the precise cause of the ADRV, but these have been regarded as highly exceptional and "*the narrowest of corridors through which such athlete must pass to discharge the burden which lies upon him*".

43. We do not consider there is anything in the present case which would justify such an exceptional finding. Notably, the Athlete has not advanced any further plausible explanation, supported by evidence, concerning the origin of the Prohibited Substance detected in her Sample.

44. That leaves the refusal by the AIU to permit DNA testing of the Sample to establish its integrity and provenance. CAS caselaw demonstrates that this will only be required when there is evidence which points towards a lack of integrity in the Sample.

45. We do not consider that there was any evidence at all before us which justified concerns about the integrity of the Sample. So, following *Gorgodze, Mullings* and *Ruffoni,* and bearing in mind that the Athlete did not use her right to analyse the B Sample, we do not consider that there was any justification for requiring a DNA test.

46. That said, we would, for the future, invite the AIU to reconsider their policy on DNA testing where the Athlete requests it. Whilst under Rule 3.2 ADR, an ADRV can be established by any reliable means, so it must follow innocence can be established by any reliable means, and it is necessary to have in mind the need for transparency, a fair trial and equality of arms. We see no reason for the AIU to pay for a DNA test in any 'normal' case. We recognise that there may be practical problems, and that the AIU may not wish the positive sample to leave its custody. But it is important that there is as much transparency as possible in sample testing and examination, and the athlete who believes themselves innocent of wrongdoing has virtually no opportunity to explore how the positive finding may have occurred. If the athlete makes clear they are willing to pay for DNA testing, we do not see why the AIU should refuse.

47. In these circumstances, and given the caselaw cited above, the Athlete's request for a DNA test is dismissed and we do not consider that the Athlete has discharged the burden on her to satisfy us that the doping was not 'intentional', and we are accordingly obliged to impose a four (4) year suspension.

48. The Athlete also said she had provided Substantial Assistance educating members of the sports community at various events on anti-doping rules and Clean Sport, illustrating her ongoing commitment to anti-doping education and values. Whilst we recognise this commitment, we do not consider it can affect the sanction we are obliged to impose.

VI. CONSEQUENCES OF SANCTION

49. In accordance with Rule 10.13 ADR, the four (4) year period of Ineligibility shall start from the date of the decision in this matter with credit for the period of Provisional Suspension served by the Athlete since 24 June 2025 (provided that it is effectively served) in accordance with Rule 10.13.2(a) ADR.

50. In accordance with Rule 9 ADR and Rule 10.1 ADR, the Athlete's individual results obtained at the 26th Asian Athletics Championships shall be automatically Disqualified, with all resulting Consequences, including forfeiture of any medals, titles, awards, points and prize and appearance money.

51. Moreover, in accordance with Rule 10.10 ADR, the Athlete's competitive results obtained from 30 May 2025 (the date of the Sample collection) through the commencement of the Provisional Suspension on 24 June 2025 shall be Disqualified (unless fairness requires otherwise) with all of the resulting Consequences, including forfeiture of any medals, titles, points, prize money, and prizes.

VII. ALLEGED BREACH OF THE PROVISIONAL SUSPENSION

52. Shortly before the oral hearing, the AIU sought to lead additional evidence which they said evidenced a breach of the Provisional Suspension by the Athlete.

53. Based on information received from the NADA India, the AIU alleged that the Athlete had breached the Provisional Suspension recently by attending the Khelo India University Games in Rajasthan, India (the '**Event**'), a recent event in India where she was entered into competition and tested.

54. On this issue, the Panel heard oral evidence from Ms Chaudhary. She said that it was true she travelled a long distance from her home to attend this Event. However, she said she did so to meet a number of college friends who were attending the Event and not to compete. Moreover, she is 30 years old and this was an under-25 competition. She does not know who entered her or why. She was cross-examined on this issue by Mr Jackson on behalf of the AIU.

55. We accept her evidence on this, and do not find this element of AIU's case proved.

VIII. COSTS

56. We note that the Athlete did not have sufficient funds to be able to afford to review the B Sample. She is facing a four (4) year ban with the Financial Consequences that that entails. We therefore make no order for costs.

IX. DISPOSITION

57. A period of Ineligibility of four (4) years is imposed upon the Athlete, commencing on the date of this decision.

58. The period of Provisional Suspension imposed on the Athlete from 24 June 2025 until the date of this decision is credited against the total period of Ineligibility. The period of Ineligibility will therefore end on 23 June 2029.

59. The Athlete's results on and since 30 May 2025 shall be Disqualified with all resulting Consequences, including the forfeiture of any medals, titles, awards, points, and prize and appearance money. There will be no order as to the costs of these proceedings.

X. RIGHT OF APPEAL

60. This decision may be appealed exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS"), located at the Palais de Beaulieu, Avenue des Bergières 10, CH-1004 Lausanne, Switzerland (procedures@tas-cas.org), in accordance with Rule 13 ADR.



Charles Hollander KC

Anna Smirnova

Hannu Kalkas

On behalf of the Disciplinary Tribunal
London, UK
25 February 2026