TAS / CAS
TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL DU SPORT
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL DEL DEPORTE

CAS 2025/A/11755 World Athletics v. Ethiopian National Anti-Doping Office and Diribe Welteji Kejelcha

ORDER

on Request for Provisional Measures

issued by the

President of the Appeals Arbitration Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport

in the arbitration between

World Athletics, Monaco
Represented by Mr Nicolas Zbinden and Mr Robert Kerslake, Attorneys-at-Law in Lausanne, Switzerland

- Appellant -

v.

Ethiopian National Anti-Doping Office, Ethiopia

- First Respondent -

and

Diribe Welteji Kejelcha, Ethiopia
Represented aby Mr Yigermal Melkam, Attorney-at-Law in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

- Second Respondent -

I. THE PARTIES

1. World Athletics ("WA" or the "Appellant") is the international federation governing the sport of athletics worldwide.

2. Ethiopian National Anti-Doping Office ("ETH-NADO" or the "First Respondent") is the national anti-doping agency in Ethiopia.

3. Ms Diribe Welteji Kejelcha (the "Athlete" or the "Second Respondent"), is an Ethiopian international level middle-distance athlete (running).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4. On 25 February 2025, the Athlete was selected to provide a blood sample in an out-of-competition test mission ordered by the ETH-NADO.

5. When the Doping Control Officer (the "DCO") arrived at the house of the Athlete, he was met at the gate by the Athlete's husband. According to the DCO's account, the Athlete's husband informed the DCO that the Athlete would not provide a sample, stating that the DCO had arrived outside the time slot specified in the Athlete's whereabouts information in ADAMS. Following discussions, the DCO apparently requested to speak directly with the Athlete who, according to the DCO's version of events, then appeared and also personally declined to provide a sample, citing the same reason regarding the timing being outside her designated slot. The DCO stated that he warned the Athlete of the potential consequences of refusing to submit to doping control under the ETH-NADO Rules 2021 (the "ADR").

6. Consequently, on 21 May 2025, the ETH-NADO charged the Athlete with an anti-doping rule violation ("ADRV") for the (alleged) violation of Article 2.3 of the ADR.

7. A hearing took place on 12 August 2025 before the Ethiopian National Anti-Doping Office Hearing Panel. Later, the Hearing Panel rendered the Appealed Decision, which found that the Athlete did not commit any ADRV. WA filed a copy of the notification letter sent by the Deputy Director General of the ETH-NADO of the "decision rendered on August 12, 2025"

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAS AND THE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS

8. On 9 September 2025, WA filed with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the "CAS") a Statement of Appeal against the Appealed Decision. In the Statement of Appeal, WA also included a Request for Provisional Measures (the "Request"), seeking a decision to be rendered by 11 September 2025 given the imminent start of the World Championship in Tokyo.

9. On the same day, the CAS Court Office notified the Statement of Appeal and the Request to the Respondents, who were granted a deadline until 11 September 2025, 10:00 CEST, to file their position on the Request.

10. On 11 September 2025, the Athlete submitted her comments on the Request. ETH-NADO did not file any comment.

IV. JURISDICTION OF THE CAS

11. In accordance with Article 186 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA), the CAS has power to decide upon its own jurisdiction.

12. The extent of the jurisdictional analysis at this point is to assess whether, on a *prima facie* basis, the CAS can be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to hear the application. The final decision on jurisdiction will be made by the Panel in its award.

13. Article R47 of the Code states that "*An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of that body.*"

14. In the absence of a specific arbitration agreement, in order for the CAS to have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, the statutes or regulations of the sports-related body from whose decision the appeal is being made must expressly recognise the CAS as an arbitral body of appeal.

15. The Appellant bases the jurisdiction of the CAS on Article 13.2.3.1 of the ADR, which reads as follows:

> *"In cases under Article 13.2.1, the following parties shall have the right to appeal to CAS: (a) the Athlete or other Person who is the subject of the decision being appealed; (b) the other party to the case in which the decision was rendered; (c) the* ***relevant International Federation****"* [emphasis added].

16. As WA is the relevant international federation, and noting that the jurisdiction of the CAS was not contested by the Respondents, the Division President is satisfied that, at least *prima facie,* CAS has jurisdiction to hear the present case.

V. ADMISSIBILITY

17. According to Article R49 of the Code, "*[i]n the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or in a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against.*"

18. In accordance with Article 13.6.1 of the ADR

> *"The time to file an appeal to CAS shall be twenty-one (21) days from the date of receipt of the decision by the appealing party. The above notwithstanding, the following shall apply in connection with appeals filed by a party entitled to appeal but which was not a party to the proceedings that led to the decision being appealed:*
>
> *(a) Within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the decision, such party/ies shall have the right to request a copy of the full case file pertaining to the decision from the Anti-Doping Organization that had Results Management authority;*

(b) If such a request is made within the fifteen (15) day period, then the party making such request shall have twenty-one (21) days from receipt of the file to file an appeal to CAS".

19. WA submits that it received the Appealed Decision on 30 August 2025 and the case file on 1 September 2025. The Athlete, for her part, seems to object to the admissibility of the Appeal, contending that the Appealed Decision was issued on 12 August 2025 and not 27 August 2025. The Athlete also refers to a different version of the Appealed Decision, which differs from the one identified and produced by WA. The 43-page Appealed Decision provided by the Athlete is unsigned and dated 12 August 2025, i.e. the date of the hearing before the Independent Hearing Panel. The document filed by WA seems to be the official notification letter of the Decision of the Hearing Panel. It contains a summary of the Decision, the signature of the ETH-NADO representative and is dated 27 August 2025. At this stage, there is no evidence that the Appealed Decision was notified prior to 27 August 2025.

20. Be that as it may, the Division President is satisfied that, at least *prima facie*, the Appeal is admissible, as it was filed within 15 days from the date in which WA received the case file.

VI. PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS AND PRAYERS FOR RELIEF

21. The following summary of the Parties' positions is illustrative only and does not necessarily comprise each contention put forward by them. However, in considering and deciding upon the Parties' claims, the President of the Appeals Arbitration Division of the CAS (the "Division President") has carefully considered all the submissions made and the evidence adduced by the Parties, even if there is no specific reference to those submissions in this section of the Award or in the legal analysis that follows.

A. The Appellant

22. In the Request, WA submits the following prayer for relief:

"By way of provisional measures
1. Diribe Welteji Kejelcha is declared ineligible until the date of the CAS award".

23. In support of its Request, WA essentially argues the following.

24. With respect to the irreparable harm test, WA argues that "*the damage done to the event by allowing the Athlete to compete would cause irreparable harm to World Athletics*" because the Appealed Decision was wrong, allowing an athlete who "*refused to provide an out-of-competition sample with no compelling justification*" to compete in the World Championships and "*take up a place in the 1500m event which would otherwise go to an athlete who did not commit an ADRV, and will compete against athletes who do not have such proceedings pending against them*". WA puts forward the "*longstanding CAS jurisprudence finding that the deprivation of an athlete's ability to compete in a major competition can amount to irreparable harm"* and argues that *"this equally applies to those athletes whose participation in the event is deprived by the inclusion of the Athlete who should have been declared ineligible",* asserting that *"these third-party interests are relevant in the assessment of irreparable harm, per standing CAS case law*".

25. WA further argues that "*significant reputational damage to WA will inevitably follow in circumstances where the Athlete competes and is later found to have violated the ADR*", emphasizing that "*this is particularly so given the current ranking of the Athlete, who is a high profile and very successful athlete currently ranked second in the world in the 1500m*". WA also highlights the stakes by noting that "*the Athlete's chances of obtaining a medal (at least) are very high, and if the appeal later overturns the erroneous Appealed Decision, the rightful winner of that medal will have lost out on a medal ceremony at the most prestigious event in the sport's calendar*", concluding that "*the integrity of the event (and the sport itself) will be liable to suffer further damage in the eyes of the public*".

26. With regard to the likelihood of success, WA argues that "*the Appealed Decision was wrong both in its assessment of the facts and in concluding that no ADRV occurred*" under Article 2.3 of the ADR, which prohibits "*without compelling justification, refusing or failing to submit to Sample collection after notification as authorised in these Anti-Doping Rules*". WA contends that "*it is uncontroversial that the doping control officers who attended at the Athlete's residence for the purpose of collecting a sample from her were authorised by ETH-NADO*" and that "*the Athlete was under no misapprehension as to why the DCOs were present at her address*". WA further argues that "*the DCOs' evidence is also clear and consistent that the Athlete, despite being warned of the consequences, refused to submit to the doping control*" and that "*on this evidence alone, the Appealed Decision should have found that the Athlete committed an ADRV*".

27. WA challenges therefore the findings that the refusal was not "*clear and unequivocal*" arguing that "*the evidence of the DCOs in terms of the Athlete's refusal is clear, and it is recalled that the DCOs have no interest in this case, and they have no reason to lie*". Critically, WA argues the Athlete's justification is implausible given her experience: "*the Athlete is an experienced athlete, included in the World Athletics' Registered Testing Pool since January 2023, who has been tested out-of-competition by both the AIU and the ETH-NADO on numerous occasions. Of the 21 times that she has been tested out-of-competition since 2023, she has been tested outside of her time slot on no less than 14 occasions*". WA notes that "*the Athlete attended an AIU education session on 21 October 2024 focussing on out-of-competition testing during which it was made clear that athletes could be tested out-of-competition at any time*", concluding that "*she knew full well therefore that testing can be and is conducted at any time of the day*".

28. Finally, as to the balance of interests, WA claims that the scale tips in favour of granting the requested measure. While WA acknowledges that "*a hardship will be visited upon the Athlete should provisional measures be granted*", it argues that "*this hardship falls significantly below the damage which will be done to WA should she be allowed to compete*". WA contends that "*as the likelihood of success on appeal is high, the risk of the consequential damage which will be caused by the Athlete's participation in the event – which will be subject to retroactive disqualification under the rules – is prevalent*". Crucially, WA argues that "*the parties whose interests are affected by the Athlete's participation are not just the Athlete against those of WA, but also against the individual athletes who will be deprived the opportunities due to them by virtue of her wrongful inclusion in the event"*, recalling that "*the interests of the other athletes who would be deprived of their opportunity to be awarded medals at the Rio Olympic Games should the Athlete successfully medal and is later determined to have committed an ADRV*".

29. WA further emphasizes that "*the significance of the World Athletics Championships being the ultimate event in the sport of Athletics cannot be overstated, and this is a crucial factor in determining where the balance of interests lies*", arguing that while similar issues would exist in smaller events, "*given the importance of the World Athletics Championships as the flagship event, significantly greater emphasis must be placed on the damage that would be caused to World Athletics, the individual affected athletes, and the wider athletics community at large*". WA concludes that since "*a 2.3 ADRV is a serious violation of the rules, which triggers a standard four-year period of Ineligibility*", it follows that "*the interests of WA, the athletic community and the Athlete's competitors must prevail*".

B. The First Respondent

30. The First Respondent did not submit any comment within the deadline granted.

C. The Second Respondent

31. In her submission, the Athlete concludes "*to dismiss the Appellant's Application for Provisional Measures*" and to "[o]*rder the Appellant and the first respondent to bear all costs associated with this application for provisional measures*".

32. The Athlete's defence to the Request may be summarized, in essence, as follows.

33. With regard to the irreparable harm test, the Athlete argues that "*the irreparable harm the appellant alleges -potential damage to the 'integrity of the sport' if the Athlete wins and is later disqualified - is speculative, administrative, and reversible*" since "*medal reallocation is an established, if unfortunate, process within the rules of sport*". In contrast, the Athlete contends that "*the harm to the athlete from the grant of this application is certain, severe and truly irreparable*" because "*she will be denied a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to compete in a major championship*" which "*is a gone forever*". The Athlete argues that "*imposing a suspension after a full exoneration would be a public and global declaration of guilt, causing devastating and permanent damage to her reputation, career, and mental well-being that no subsequent legal victory could ever fully repair*", along with "*immediate and significant financial losses from lost prizes, bonuses, and sponsorship opportunities*".

34. As to the likelihood of success, the Athlete argues that "*the appellants' appeal has a very low probability of success*" because "*its case is built on a foundation of its own agent's procedural failures*". The defense emphasizes that "*the first-instance panel's decision was a factual finding that the evidence presented did not meet the required standard of proof*" and that "*CAS panels afford significant deference to the factual assessments of first-instance bodies that heard live testimony and assessed witness credibility*". Critically, the Athlete contends that "*the uncontested and admitted fact that the DCOs failed to perform the key procedural step to document a refusal-offering the Refusal Form- is fatal to their appeal*" and that "*the first respondent admitted during the first hearing that the athlete didn't refuse orally*". The Athlete argues that her actions of being "*awake from sleep and present herself to the DCOs and follow them to the door and asked to take sample once she is awaken from sleep shows lack of intention to refuse*", with "*no video evidence presented, no document evidence including DCF and refusal form*" to support the charge.

35. Finally, with respect to the balance of interests, the Athlete argues that "*the current status quo, established by a final decision, is that the Athlete is innocent and eligible to compete*" and that "*the AIU seeks to overturn this just outcome".* The defense contends that "*the balance of interests firmly favors protecting the Athlete from the irreparable harm detailed above*" because "*the interests of 'clean sport' were served by a fair hearing that exonerated her*". The Athlete argues that "*granting this Application would undermine confidence in the anti-doping system by demonstrating that even a successful defense can be nullified by a powerful appellant on the eve of competition*" and that "*to impose another suspension after she has been cleared is a grossly unfair 'double punishment' and a violation of fundamental principles of justice".*

VII. LEGAL DISCUSSION

36. Pursuant to Article 183 of the PILA, an international arbitral tribunal in Switzerland is empowered to order provisional or conservatory measures at the request of one party: "*Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, the arbitral tribunal may, on motion of one party, order provisional or conservatory measures.*"

37. Pursuant to Article R37 para 3 of the Code, the Division President is competent to consider an application for a stay prior to the file having been transferred to the Panel.

38. In accordance with Article R37 of the Code and CAS jurisprudence (*CAS 2007/A/1370-1376*; *CAS 2006/A/1088*; *CAS 2004/A/780*; *TAS 2004/A/708-709*; *CAS 2003/O/486*; *CAS 2002/A/378*; *CAS 2001/A/324*), when deciding whether an application for a stay should be ordered, the Division President should in general consider the following factors:

    a) whether the stay requested is necessary to protect the Appellant from irreparable harm ("irreparable harm" test): the Appellant must demonstrate that the requested stay is necessary in order to protect its position from damage or risks that would be impossible, or very difficult, to remedy or cancel at a later stage;

    b) whether the Appellant has reasonable chances to succeed on the merits ("likelihood of success" test): the Appellant must demonstrate that its position is not obviously groundless and that it has reasonable chances eventually to win the case;

    c) whether the interests of the Appellant outweigh those of the opposite party and of third parties ("balance of interests" test): the Appellant must demonstrate that the harm or inconvenience it would suffer from the refusal of the requested stay would be comparatively greater than the harm or inconvenience other parties would suffer from the granting of the provisional measures.

39. The Division President notes that the three requirements for the grant of a stay (i.e. irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal and balance of interests) are cumulative (*CAS 2007/A/1403*; *TAS 2007/A/1397*; and *CAS 2010/A/2071*).

40. The Division President will therefore assess the Request in the light of the above requirements.

Likelihood of success

41. The Division President will start her assessment with the *fumus boni iuris* test.

42. In accordance with CAS jurisprudence, when deciding whether to grant a stay, the Applicant "*must make at least a plausible case that the facts relied upon by him and rights which he seeks to enforce exist and that the material criteria for a cause of action are fulfilled*" (the "likelihood of success" test) (CAS 2000/A/274, CAS 2004/A/578, CAS 2014/A/3751).

43. As was noted in CAS 2001/A/324, an applicant for provisional measures "*must give the impression that the facts have a certain probability, and must also make summarily plausible that the rights cited exist and that the material conditions for a legal action are fulfilled*".

44. The Division President concurs with the approach established in CAS 2024/A/10317: "*The evidence available to a Panel at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings is necessarily incomplete. It is, of course, untested by cross-examination. When considering likelihood of success on the merits, it is not appropriate for the panel to conduct a mini trial of sorts. The Panel must assess the evidence in its imperfect state and form a view as to whether the appeal 'cannot be denied' or, put another way, 'cannot be definitively discounted'".* The Division President will, therefore, assess whether WA "has a case" by considering whether WA has presented arguments that cannot be discounted, particularly given the limited defense presented by the Athlete at this stage, without prejudging matters that will be before the appointed tribunal.

45. In this assessment, the Division President will consider the elements leading to the charges against the Athlete, namely her refusal to provide a sample or, stated neutrally, the circumstances that prevented the test from being conducted.

46. The Athlete's primary argument is that the DCO failed to comply with the "*mandatory procedural step of offering the Athlete a 'Refusal Form' to sign"* and that after the Athlete questioned the timing of the test, the DCO simply left the premises. The Athlete contends she did not refuse to provide a sample but merely questioned why the test was conducted outside her designated time slot, thereby disturbing her rest period.

47. The Division President acknowledges that this dispute centers on conflicting accounts of the doping control session. WA contends the Athlete refused testing without compelling justification, while the Athlete maintains the DCO's account was inaccurate, as demonstrated by his testimony before the Hearing Panel. Resolving this factual dispute requires evidence assessment and witness examination that only the appointed tribunal can properly conduct. At this stage, the Division President must rely on the evidence and submissions presented. The Athlete asks the Division President to accept the Appealed Decision's findings, which in her view clearly show she merely posed a question that the DCO misinterpreted as refusal. WA maintains that DCO accounts deserve high credibility as DCOs have no reason to fabricate evidence.

48. Without conducting detailed analysis of the competing versions, the Division President finds that WA's account appears, at least prima facie, plausible and cannot be completely discounted. The test for provisional measures is not to determine which party is correct, but simply to assess

whether the case has merit prospects. The Division President accepts that the account given by the DCO shall be given a certain degree of credibility, as sustained by WA, thus making the prospect of success on the merits not a remote possibility. While, as stated, it will be possible to cast light on the real circumstances of the doping control only after a full hearing, for the purposes of this Order the Division President is satisfied that WA's position can reasonably be sustained, thus meeting the test of likelihood of success.

Irreparable Harm

49. As a general rule, in accordance with CAS jurisprudence and when deciding whether to grant a request for a stay, the CAS shall consider if the requested measure is useful to protect the Applicant from substantial damage that would be difficult to remedy at a later stage ("irreparable harm" test): "[t]*he Appellant must demonstrate that the requested measures are necessary to protect his position from damage or risks that would be impossible, or very difficult, to remedy or cancel at a later stage*" (CAS 2007/A/1370-1376, CAS 2008/A/1630).

50. It is cardinal to mention that the party claiming a prejudice "*must demonstrate that the requested measures are necessary in order to protect his position from damage or risks that would be impossible, or very difficult, to remedy or cancel at a later stage*" (CAS 2010/A/2113 and quoted references) and "*without any concrete evidence to justify damages (or potential damages as the case may be) general allegations of potential harm do not suffice to establish irreparable harm*" (CAS 2014/A/3642, order of 5 August 2014, emphasis added).

51. In light of the above legal framework, the Division President must determine whether the Appellant would suffer irreparable harm if the Athlete were not suspended and, consequently, not prevented from competing in the World Championships.

52. The Division President, having carefully considered the arguments of the Appellant and the Athlete, finds that WA has demonstrated the existence of a concrete risk of irreparable harm.

53. First, the nature of the World Championships as the premier competition in the sport of athletics, justifies the crucial importance of preserving its integrity and ensuring proper conduct while avoiding potential *ex post* disruptions such as medal reallocations. This necessity requires WA to guarantee that competition results are not rewritten by subsequent tribunal decisions, thereby preserving the genuineness of the competition and the sporting achievements of all athletes. This objective is of vital importance for any international federation and assumes even greater significance when dealing with the flagship competition of the sporting calendar.

54. As demonstrated above, the Division President considers that the likelihood of success of the Appeal is substantial. Based on a prima facie assessment of the available evidence, and without prejudice to later evaluation by the appointed tribunal, the Athlete's defense in support of her refusal to provide a sample does not present compelling reasons to justify such refusal, respectively sufficient elements able to rebut the account of the DCO. In the absence of strong compelling justification, the Division President finds that there are strong prospects that the Appeal will ultimately succeed. Given the factual and legal background surrounding the doping control, and the realistic possibility that the Appeal will be upheld resulting in the Athlete's ineligibility and subsequent disqualification of any results achieved, allowing her to compete in the World Championships, with a strong chance of winning a medal that may ultimately be

withdrawn, would clearly jeopardize the integrity and credibility of the competition while depriving another athlete of rightful achievement. While these circumstances alone would not be sufficient to establish irreparable harm for WA, the fact that the Athlete voluntarily prevented the antidoping control from taking place, without proper justification, no longer allows her to submit that she would suffer irreparable harm if provisionally suspended; on the contrary, the irreparable harm shifts on the side of WA, which is deprived of the possibility to know if the Athlete would have been tested positive or not and to determine if the competitions it organizes would be fair and equitable. The Athlete would have been certainly in a better position if she had undergone the antidoping test under protest, with a possibility for her to challenge the validity or reliability of the test at a later stage. Therefore, the Division President accepts that under the particular circumstances of this case, combined with the importance of the competition, to allow her to compete despite the concrete risk of ultimate ineligibility would unjustifiably deprive other athletes of competition opportunities and potential success. While medal reallocations are regrettably not uncommon in sport, they must be avoided whenever possible. In this respect, the Division President observes that reallocations typically occur when an athlete is later found to have committed an ADRV which was unknown at the time of the specific competition. In this case, it is undisputed that the Athlete was already involved in antidoping proceedings and is suspected to have committed a possible ADRV which, as mentioned, has a realistic prospect of lead to a sanction.

55. Furthermore, the Division President finds it useful to apply, by analogy, the test used when assessing optional provisional suspensions, which should be imposed unless "*the assertion of an anti-doping rule violation has no reasonable prospect of being upheld"* (Article 7.9.3.2 of the ADR). As established above, the ADRV has a reasonable prospect of being upheld, therefore supporting provisional suspension. Applying this standard to the present Request, the Division President finds that in circumstances where the ADRV has serious prospects of confirmation, allowing the Athlete to compete would severely compromise the integrity of the competition and prejudice other athletes not involved in anti-doping proceedings likely to result in sanctions. This certainly amounts to irreparable harm for WA as the body sanctioning the specific event, for all other athletes who would have to compete with the Athlete, as well as for athletes who may enter the competition instead of the Second Respondent.

56. Based on the foregoing, the Division President finds that WA successfully established the existence of a concrete risk of irreparable harm.

Balance of interest

57. In accordance with CAS jurisprudence, as a general rule, when deciding whether to grant provisional and conservatory measures, the CAS considers whether the interests of the applicant outweigh those of the opposite party and of third parties ("balance of interests" test): "*It is then necessary to compare the disadvantages to the Appellant of immediate execution of the decision with the disadvantages for the Respondent of being deprived such execution*" (*CAS 2008/A/1453*; *CAS 2008/A/1630*; *CAS 2008/A/1677*).

58. As established above, the Division President accepts that the Request meets the irreparable harm test, as the prejudice that would occur should the Athlete be allowed to compete in circumstances where she may later be found to have committed an ADRV and her results disqualified is considerable. Not only would WA be harmed in such a scenario, but the integrity

of the competition and the interests of other athletes would be undermined. Protecting these interests clearly outweighs the interest of the Athlete in participating in the competition. When comparing the interests of the Appellant, other athletes, and specifically the athlete who would lose the opportunity to compete in the World Championships because her place is taken by an athlete who may ultimately be sanctioned and disqualified, with the possible harm that the Athlete may suffer if the Request were upheld, the Division President finds that the balance clearly tips against the Athlete. Allowing her to compete in the presence of ongoing anti-doping proceedings which may conclude with a sanction, with the concrete possibility of ex post reallocation of medals thus depriving other athletes of winning a medal or competing, cannot be justified by the interest of the Athlete in participating in the World Championships.

59. The Division President therefore concludes that the Request meets the balance of interest test.

VIII. CONCLUSION

60. In view of the above considerations, the Division President concludes that the Request meets the standard pursuant to Article R37 of the Code and, as such, it must be upheld.

IX. COSTS

61. According to standard CAS practice, the cost of this part of the proceedings will be settled in the final award or in any other final disposition of this arbitration.

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ON THESE GROUNDS

The President of the Appeals Arbitration Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:

1. The Application for Provisional Measures filed by World Athletics on 9 September 2025 in the matter *CAS 2025/A/11755 World Athletics v. Ethiopian National Anti-Doping Office and Diribe Welteji Kejelcha* is upheld.

2. Ms Diribe Welteji Kejelcha is suspended for the duration of this arbitration procedure.

3. The costs of the present order shall be determined in the final award or in any other final disposition of this arbitration.

Lausanne, 12 September 2025

COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

Corinne Schmidhauser
President of the Appeals Arbitration Division